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To Sell or Not to Sell, That Is the Question:
The Rescission of Sale on the Basis of Lesion and Its
Applicability to Mineral Rights
I. A BRIEF INSIGHT–
LESION, MINERALS, AND THE PROBLEMS WITHIN
One of the most sacred possessions held by man is his property.1
Imagine that you own a tract of land. After much contemplation, you
decide to sell this tract for $28,000. A short time after completion of this
sale, you are informed that the purchaser discovered significant amounts
of gravel beneath the surface of the tract. This gravel is valued at
approximately $100,000.00, nearly four times the original selling price.
Objectively, it looks like a bad deal. You may be thinking that you have
just been scammed; you are likely angry that you lost out on a fortune. Is
there anything you can do?
The above facts simulate the issue in Hornsby v. Slade,2 where Ms.
Hornsby filed suit to set aside the sale of a certain tract of land because of
lesion beyond moiety.3 Similar to Ms. Hornsby, your immediate reaction
may be to file suit against the purchaser. Do you have a cause of action to
file such a suit? This article delves into that issue.
One course of action in such a scenario is found within the Louisiana
Civil Code, which establishes a cause of action for lesion beyond moiety.4
Lesion beyond moiety is the act of an individual rescinding the sale of an
immovable on the basis of lesion due to the price being less than one-half
of the fair market value of that immovable.5 Only the seller can claim

Copyright 2017, by DAKOTA HAWKINS.
1. See James Madison, Property, Papers 14:266-68 (1792).
2. Hornsby v. Slade, 854 So. 2d 441 (La. Ct. App. 2003).
3. Id. at 442. The sale of an immovable may be rescinded for lesion when
the price is less than one half of the fair market value of the immovable. Lesion
can be claimed only by the seller and only in sales of corporeal immovables. It
cannot be alleged in a sale made by order of the court. The seller may invoke
lesion even if he has renounced the right to claim it. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2589
(2017) (emphasis added). The definition of moiety is commonly referred to as “a
half of something.” Moiety, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
4. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2589 (2017). Lesion is defined as “[l]oss from
another’s failure to perform a contract” or “the injury suffered by one who did not
receive the equivalent value of what was bargained for.” Lesion, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis added).
5. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2589 (2017).
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lesion in the sale of corporeal immovables, such as land.6 Lesion cannot
be alleged in a sale made by order of the court. The seller may invoke
lesion even if he has renounced the right to claim it.7 Additionally, parties
giving corporeal immovables in exchange8 may demand the value of the
thing from which he was evicted or the return of the thing he gave, with
damages available as awarded in either case.9
Unfortunately, your question does not have a straightforward answer.
The Louisiana Civil Code allows rescission on the grounds of lesion
beyond moiety.10 However, under the Louisiana Mineral Code, the sale of
a mineral right is not subject to rescission for lesion beyond moiety.11 To
address the obvious legislative conflict, the Mineral Code provides that in
the event of any conflict between the provisions of the Mineral Code and
any provision of the Civil Code, the provisions of the Mineral Code will
prevail.12
While a literal reading would show that the Mineral Code’s preclusion
applies only to mineral rights as a simple exception to the Louisiana Civil
Code’s allowance of lesionary actions, perhaps Mineral Code article 17
should not only apply to mineral interests, but also land sales functioning
practically the same as the sale of a mineral interest. Consider a situation
where the value of a piece of land is an absolute zero. If that piece of land
is sold for a value according to the value given to the minerals beneath,
but the contract terms only express the sale of the land itself with the
underlying motive of the value of the minerals, the differing code articles
provide differing solutions with a meritless economic distinction.
Regarding the sale of a tract of land, the sale of all rights is included
with the land, unless clearly separated in an instrument. Therefore, it is
necessary to draw a teleological extension from the legislative purpose in
applying Mineral Code article 17 not only to mineral rights, but also to the
sale of land functioning practically the same as the sale of the mineral
interest. Courts have avoided such a necessary extension thus far;

6. Id. “[T]here are only two kinds of immovables: corporeal immovables
and incorporeal immovables. Corporeal immovables are tracts of land with their
component parts
“ A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE:
PROPERTY § 7:8 (5th ed. 2015) [hereinafter YIANNOPOULOS, TREATISE].
7. Id.
8. “Exchange is a contract whereby each party transfers to the other the
ownership of a thing other than money.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 2660 (2017).
9. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2662 (2017).
10. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2589 (2017).
11. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:17 (1975).
12. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:2 (1975).
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however, it is crucial to the proper application of the differing lesion
articles within the Civil and Mineral Codes.
So, turning back to the original hypothetical, is your cause of action
precluded by the Mineral Code? Perhaps not. The current jurisprudential
interpretation of the application of lesion pertaining to minerals is unclear;
Louisiana courts both preclude and allow successful actions for lesion
beyond moiety pertaining to minerals found beneath land post-sale.13
These jurisprudential inconsistencies may allow claimants a method of
circumventing the Mineral Code’s preclusion of lesion beyond moiety.
This article will discuss how these inconsistencies can be resolved through
a hybrid approach drawn from the foundational case pertaining to this
issue, Wilkins v. Nelson. Thereafter, it will discuss the subsequent Hornsby
v. Slade dissenting opinion and propose a practical application drawn from
the case that exemplifies how the Mineral Code’s preclusion of lesion
pertaining to mineral rights should be applied.14 An examination of
Louisiana cases pertaining to lesion beyond moiety reveals the need for a
new application of the law that will clarify the jurisprudential disparities.
Part II of this article will provide the historical background of lesion
for a better understanding of the historically different applications of
lesion, including and explaining all relevant legislation, language, and
methodologies. Part III will discuss the issues presented by notable cases
and discussions surrounding rescission based on lesion pertaining to
minerals. Finally, Part IV will propose an analytical framework detailing
how the differing coded lesion articles should be applied when an action
based on lesion beyond moiety is brought.
II. A LOOK INTO THE PAST:
THE CIVIL LAW, THE MINERAL CODE, AND SURROUNDING POLICIES
[F]or over eighty years, it has been the law of Louisiana that a sale
of mineral rights ‘cannot be regarded as . . . falling within the
terms of the law which affords relief on the score of lesion; its
inherent nature and character being such as not to be susceptible
of having an intrinsic definite and fixable value.’15

13. It is important to note that the Louisiana Law Institute formed a
committee in 2016 to answer the questions raised by this article, chaired by
Professor John Trahan, faculty of the Paul M. Hebert Louisiana State University
Law Center.
14. Hornsby, 854 So. 2d at 446 (McClendon, J., dissenting).
15. Thomas v. Pride Oil & Gas Properties, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 238, 243
(W.D. La. 2009) (citing Wilkins v. Nelson, 99 So. 607, 608 (La. 1924)).
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While a straightforward reading of this statement appears to set a firm
legal principle, Louisiana courts’ recent analyses vary greatly as to
whether lesion beyond moiety should be applied to the sale of minerals. It
is unclear why such an inconsistency has developed; however, one may
consider the limited amount of legal scholarship available to the courts
pertaining to this area, in conjunction with the low volume of jurisprudence
to draw from, in understanding the numerous applications for lesion
pertaining to minerals.
A. The Prevailing Law
Louisiana’s legal system is civilian, based heavily on its French and
Spanish heritage which prioritizes legislation above judge-made law. The
Louisiana Civil Code states in its first article that the sources of law in
Louisiana are legislation and custom.16 In the absence of legislation or
custom, the court is bound to proceed according to equity.17 Even where a
court proceeds according to equity, that single decision is not considered
binding upon later courts, because Louisiana does not recognize the doctrine
of stare decisis.18 Instead, a long line of judicial decisions may be
considered mere guidance for the courts to follow according to the doctrine
of jurisprudence constante.19
The guiding statutory provisions pertaining to lesion are drawn from
the Louisiana Civil Code and the Mineral Code. The phrase “lesion
beyond moiety” stems from the Latin laesio enormis, a legal doctrine
developed according to the ideals of “just price” found in the Corpus Juris
Civilis.20 The Civil Code’s lesion article specifically applies only to those
things considered corporeal immovables.21
In Louisiana, things are divided into common, public, and private
things; corporeals and incorporeals; and movables and immovables.22
Corporeals are things that have a body, whether animate or inanimate, and

16. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1 (2017).
17. LA. CIV. CODE art. 4 (2017).
18. See Ardoin v. Hartford Acc’t & Indem. Co., 360 So. 2d 1331, 1334 (La.
1978); Carter v. Moore, 248 So. 2d 921, 959 (1971); Johnson v. St. Paul Mercury
Ins. Co., 236 So. 2d 216, 218 (1970), overruled on other grounds.
19. See Heinick v. Jefferson Parish School Bd., 701 So. 2d 1047, 1050 (La. Ct.
App. 1997); City of New Orleans v. Treen, 421 So. 2d 282, 285 (La. Ct. App. 1982).
20. DIAN TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & DAVID GRUNING, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
TREATISE: SALES § 13:3 (2017).
21. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2589 (2017).
22. LA. CIV. CODE art. 448 (2017).
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can be felt or touched.23 Incorporeals are things that have no body but are
comprehended by understanding. Rights of inheritance, servitudes,
obligations, and rights of intellectual property are incorporeal things.24 Tracts
of land, with their component parts, are immovables.25 Importantly, mineral
rights are not considered component parts of tracts of land but are rather
considered incorporeal immovables.26
To establish a cause of action for lesion, the immovable sold must be
evaluated according to the condition in which it was at the time of the
sale.27 If a sale is deemed to be lesionary, the buyer has two choices: (1)
return the immovable to the seller, or (2) keep the immovable and give the
seller a supplement equal to the difference between the price paid and the
fair market value.28 The action for lesion must be brought within a
peremptive period of one year from the time of the sale.29
Conversely, the Mineral Code provides that the sale of a mineral right
may not be rescinded based on lesion beyond moiety.30 In the 1924 case
Wilkins v. Nelson, the Louisiana Supreme Court established that the
Louisiana Civil Code article for lesion does not apply to mineral interests.31
This decision was later codified into the current Louisiana Mineral Code
article 17, which precludes lesion for mineral rights.32 Herein lies a major
disparity among the Codes.
Mineral Code article 4 states that the Code “is applicable to all forms of
minerals, including oil and gas.” The Code is also “applicable to rights to
explore for or mine or remove from land the soil itself, gravel, shells,
subterranean water, or other substances occurring naturally in or as a part of
the soil or geological formations on or underlying the land.”33 The Mineral
23. LA. CIV. CODE art. 461 (2017).
24. Id.
25. LA. CIV. CODE art. 462 (2017). Buildings, other constructions permanently
attached to the ground, standing timber, and unharvested crops or ungathered fruits
of trees, are component parts of a tract of land when they belong to the owner of the
ground. LA. CIV. CODE art. 463 (2017).
26. Rights and actions that apply to immovable things are incorporeal
immovables. Immovables of this kind are such as personal servitudes established
on immovables, predial servitudes, mineral rights, and petitory or possessory
actions. LA. CIV. CODE art. 470 (2017).
27. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2590 (2017).
28. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2591 (2017).
29. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2595 (2017).
30. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:17 (1975).
31. 99 So. 607 (La. 1924).
32. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:17 (1975).
33. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:4 (1975).
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Code does not attempt a firm definition of the term “minerals;” however,
the comment to article 4 provides some guidance:
The purpose of including oil and gas within the meaning of the term
minerals is solely to indicate the applicability of the code to those
substances and has no relationship whatsoever to the problem of
construing particular conveyances to determine whether specific
substances are included or excluded from the terms of an
instrument. Insofar as construction of instruments for this purpose
is concerned, the Supreme Court has stated in Holloway Gravel Co.
v. McKowen, 200 La. 917, 925, 9 So. 2d 228, 231 (1942), that the
term “mineral” is not a definite one . . . but is susceptible of
limitation according to the intention of the parties using it and in
determining its meaning, regard must be had not only to the
language of the deed in which it occurs, but also to the relative
positions of the parties interested and to the substance of the
transaction which the deed embodies.34
A focus on the particularity required by the legislature of the property sold
being a corporeal immovable, the fact that the right to produce minerals is
considered an incorporeal, and how such applications should be
interpreted and applied to the sale of minerals is crucial to determining
whether there is a cause of action for lesion.
B. The Lack of Guidance from Secondary Sources
Jurisprudence in Louisiana is considered a secondary source of law,
following the primary sources of law: legislation and custom.35 Therefore,
jurisprudence and doctrine may guide a court in reaching a decision only
in the absence of legislation and custom. As the legislation in this area
appears contradictory, our attention must turn to the jurisprudence available.
The study of lesion beyond moiety pertaining to minerals has been
neglected within the civilian legal field, specifically with reference to the
inconsistencies within this line of jurisprudence. The most applicable
secondary source to this discussion is Patrick H. Martin’s Louisiana Mineral
Law Treatise;36 however, the treatise contains a mere four paragraphs,
which are not helpful in interpreting the proper application as set by the
Louisiana courts. This short rendition discusses the preclusion of a

34. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:4 cmt. (1975).
35. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1 (2017).
36. PATRICK H. MARTIN, LOUISIANA MINERAL LAW TREATISE (2012).
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lesionary action according to the Mineral Code, supporting a bar on the
speculative value of mineral rights.37
While this short statement is a proper beginning to the analysis, the
treatise moves away from proper application by providing Thomas v. Pride
Oil & Gas Properties, Inc. as an illustration, a case that instead focused on
misrepresentations and fiduciary duties surrounding the sale of mineral
rights.38 These pages lack guidance of the proper application of rescission
for mineral discovery on the basis of lesion.
Professor A. N. Yiannopoulos provides that “Louisiana courts have
allowed the action for lesion beyond moiety in connection with the sales of
immovables by nature or destination, but have refused to allow it in cases
involving sale of mineral interests.”39 While this statement is factually
correct, it is outdated and recent jurisprudence has upset this once-settled
premise.
III. THE CURRENT CONFUSING CASE LAW
APPLICABLE TO LESION ACTIONS FOR MINERALS
Multiple applications, interpretations, and conclusions of the law
pertaining to rescission based on lesion beyond moiety may be drawn from
the select cases that have made their way through the Louisiana court
system. While each case on its own may not provide an accurate depiction
of the law, when explained and picked apart according to civilian legal
principles derived from the Civil Code and the Mineral Code, the cases
provide a workable framework for future application.
A. Wilkins v. Nelson (1924)
The foundational case for the issue of lesion in the context of mineral
sales is Wilkins v. Nelson, where the Louisiana Supreme Court determined
that when the Louisiana Civil Code “restricted the action of lesion to
immovables, it meant immovables which are such by their nature and not
such as are made immovables by disposition of the law.”40 The question of
whether the preclusion of an action for lesion to immovables in Louisiana
Civil Code article 1862 applied to minerals arose when J.D. Wilkins
commenced an action for rescission on the basis of lesion beyond moiety to
37. Id. at 88.
38. Id. at 89.
39. A. N. Yiannopoulos, Movables and Immovables in Louisiana and
Comparative Law, 22 LA. L. REV. 517, 555 (1962) [hereinafter Yiannopoulos,
Movables].
40. See Wilkins, 99 So. at 608 (emphasis added).
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set aside a sale of all of the oil, gas, and minerals in, to, and under 120 acres
of land situated in the Parish of Ouachita.41
The sale at issue was executed between J.D. Wilkins and Oscar Nelson
for $900 cash and one-eighth interest in and to all of the oil produced or
saved from the tract of land.42 Mr. Wilkins alleged that the mineral rights
on and under the land were worth $50,000 but that he was ignorant of this
fact at the time of the sale and had no experience in land development or
minerals, unlike Mr. Nelson, who had spent his entire life doing such
work.43
The Court relied on two separate rationales to determine that the
lesionary action was properly precluded:
First, because the thing, the subject of the sale, cannot be regarded
as one falling within the terms of the law which affords relief on the
score of lesion; its inherent nature and character being such as not
to be susceptible of having an intrinsic definite and fixable value.
Second, because the plaintiff’s petition alleges that his vendee had
parted with all of his interest in the mineral rights to a third party.44
Focusing on the first sentence, the Court reiterated the well-established rule
of law that ownership of land does not include a separate and distinct
ownership of those minerals beneath the land, but that the landowner has the
right to explore for and reduce those minerals to possession and ownership.45
In conveying the right to Nelson, “no title of ownership to any specific thing,
separate and distinct from the soil” was transferred, “but merely the right to
drill and capture, and reduce to possession such quantities of the oil and gas
as might be found under the ground.”46 The Court determined such a transfer
is most similar to a transfer of a real or incorporeal right, such as the right
of servitude.47
The Court opined that although servitudes are considered immovables
under the Louisiana Civil Code, “it by no means follows that such a
41. Id. Note that in 1924, Louisiana Civil Code article 1862 was the current
article pertaining to the application of lesion. Lesion can be alleged by persons of
full age in no other sale than one for immovables, in which is included whatever
is immovable by destination.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. Defendant transferred his rights in the property to Cosmos Carbon
Company, which happened to be his own company, not at issue for this article’s
purposes.
45. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 31:5-31:6 (1975).
46. Wilkins, 99 So. at 608.
47. Id.
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servitude as here involved which is also declared to be a real and incorporeal
right – is to be regarded as an immovable in the sense in which the word
immovable is used in article 1861 of the code.”48 The Court stated that it
was established long ago that not “every kind of immovable is brought
under or falls within the terms of the article conferring the action of lesion
upon a vendor.”49
In its decision, the Court emphasized the words “speculative” and
“intangible,” counter to “fixed” and “dependable,” stating that an opposite
view would provide the seller with a win-win situation, in effect, placing
the entirety of the risk upon the buyer.50 The Court stated, “Had there been
no gas found in the land in question the plaintiff would doubtless have
been perfectly satisfied with the cash price he received, but, gas having
been discovered, he now seeks an additional profit.”51
The Wilkins Court’s interpretation precludes the action of lesion to
mineral rights that are deemed incorporeal immovables.52 Fifty years later,
in 1974, the Wilkins rule was codified into Louisiana Mineral Code article
17, supra.53 However, since Wilkins,54 lower Louisiana courts have taken
multiple approaches on the issue of how minerals should be considered in
an action for lesion beyond moiety, moving distinctly away from this
overarching ruling.
B. Hornsby v. Slade (2003)
In 2003, the First Circuit Court of Appeal chose to steer away from
the nearly eighty-year-old jurisprudence. The court upheld a district court
decision that “the value of sand and gravel or solid mineral deposits in the
land sold could be considered in determining the fair market value of the
land and, thus, subject the sale to a cause of action for lesion beyond
moiety.”55
This dispute arose when Ms. Hornsby sold her 5/18ths undivided
interest in 364 acres of immovable property in East Feliciana Parish to the

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 609.
Id. at 608.
Id. at 607.
Id.
Id.
Hornsby, 854 So. 2d at 445.
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defendant Slade. Four years after the completion of the sale, Ms. Hornsby
filed suit for rescission based on lesion beyond moiety.56
The parties stipulated that the purchase price of the property was
$28,000.00, and the value of the raw land was between $26,750.00 and
$37,387.60. The parties also stipulated that the value of the gravel itself
would add $97,417.50 to the value of the land. Therefore, if the court
allowed sand and gravel evidence (to the value of the raw land), the sale
was lesionary. 57 The sale price of the tract of land amounted to a little less
than one-fourth of the value of the gravel itself. Slade then filed a motion
in limine to exclude appraisal information based on results of gravel
testing and inspection reports made after the date of the sale.
The district court found the sale subject to rescission for lesion. The
district court opined that “the gravel constituted a solid mineral which was
an inseparable component of the ground and, therefore, the data and
information as to the gravel deposits could be used to determine the value
of the land as of the date of the sale.”58 Slade appealed. A divided First
Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed the decision, determining that the “value
of sand and gravel or solid mineral deposits in the land sold could be
considered in determining fair market value of the land and, thus, subject
the sale to [a] cause of action for lesion beyond moiety.”59
The majority focused on the distinction between incorporeal and
corporeal immovables. It found that land with mineral deposits is
considered corporeal immovables, which are subject to lesion, while those
mineral rights in the land are incorporeal immovables, which are not
subject to lesion.60 This distinction is crucial to the determination and
application of lesion. The court then turned to the distinction between solid
minerals which are inseparable component parts of the ground, and nonsolid minerals, commonly referred to as fugacious minerals, which are in
theory res nullius.61 Due to the free-flowing nature of fugacious minerals,
56. At this time, the peremptive period for an action based on lesion was four
years. Louisiana Civil Code article 2595 established a prescriptive period of four
years for actions for the rescission of sales based on lesion beyond moiety. “Acts
1993, No. 841, section 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1995, changed Article 2595 to provide a
preemptive period of one year in actions for lesion.” Id. at 442 n.2.
57. Id. at 442.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 445.
60. Id. at 446.
61. “Deposits of solid minerals are inseparable component parts of the
ground, whereas fugacious minerals are in theory res nullius.” However, the right
to possession belongs to the owner of the ground. The owner of the ground may
segregate the mineral rights from the ownership of the land and either retain them
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fugacious minerals are not considered owned by the landowner above, but
this landowner is given the exclusive right to explore for, develop, and
reduce to possession those fugitive minerals.62 The minerals here,
however, are solid minerals (sand and gravel), considered naturally owned
by the landowner but insusceptible of ownership apart from the ground
until reduced to possession.63 This distinction was not clearly referenced
in accordance with the decision; however, these solid minerals must be
treated the same as mineral interests for this article’s purposes since their
ownership may not be transferred separately from ownership of the ground
itself.
Ms. Hornsby argued that sand and gravel are naturally corporeal solid
minerals, and lesion only lies in cases of corporeal immovables, as distinguished
from mineral rights that are classified as incorporeal immovables under
Louisiana Civil Code article 470.64 Therefore, the value of the gravel and sand
that lay beneath the land should be considered in the fair market value of the
land, resulting in an inequitable sale subject to rescission.
Mr. Slade argued that it has been the doctrine of Louisiana that one
does not own mineral interests until they are reduced to possession, but
that one simply owns the right to produce those minerals beneath the
land.65 Slade emphasized that there is “little or no intrinsic value” in the
gravel and sand due to the “speculative nature” of minerals.66 When such
minerals are “left in place, the sand and gravel add no extra value to the
land,” and therefore an action for rescission based on lesion should be
precluded, as is stated within Louisiana Mineral Code article 17.67 This
argument resembles that of the Wilkins court.68
The court found Mr. Slade’s argument to be without merit and found
that the statutory schemes have distinguished (1) the classification of land
himself or convey them to another person. Accordingly, rights in minerals may
be regarded as separable component parts of the ownership of land. Mineral rights
segregated from the ownership of land ordinarily take the form of the mineral
servitude, a mineral lease, or a mineral royalty. YIANNOPOULOS, TREATISE, supra
note 6, at § 118, π. 276–277. “[R]es nullius, under the French law, the source of
Louisiana’s occupancy law . . . refers specifically to such things as wild game and
fish, which are originally without an owner.” Charrier v. Bell, 496 So. 2d 601,
605 (La. Ct. App. 1986).
62. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:6 (1975).
63. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:5 (1975).
64. Hornsby, 854 So. 2d at 445.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.; Wilkins, 99 So. 607.
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with mineral deposits and (2) the classification of the alienation of
component parts called mineral rights.69 The court held that the former are
corporeal immovables subject to lesionary inquiry, and the latter are
incorporeal immovables not subject to a lesionary inquiry.70 Therefore,
“lands with known mineral deposits may be valued as an entity and the
trial judge was correct in permitting that testimony.”71
Justice McClendon stated in a notable dissent that the provisions of
the Mineral Code do apply and that the rescission based on lesion beyond
moiety should not have been permitted.72 The dissenting opinion discussed
a major flaw in the majority’s argument: their failure to distinguish
between the actual sand and gravel beneath the land that is a corporeal
immovable, and the underlying mineral right, which is clearly an
incorporeal immovable.73 This distinction is based on the idea that solid
minerals are insusceptible of ownership apart from the land until reduced
to possession.74 “Minerals in their natural state cannot be ‘owned’
separately from the land.”75
With ownership of the land, Ms. Hornsby also held ownership to the
minerals beneath the land. However, she is not able to transfer her
ownership of those minerals separately from her ownership of the ground;
the minerals are considered inherently connected to the ownership of the
land itself and may not be conveyed and valued separately until reduced
to possession and ownership as a movable.76 Therefore, “the unproduced
minerals beneath the surface have little or no intrinsic value” apart from
the land.77 Justice McClendon’s dissent focuses on the fact that the added
value to the land comes from the right to explore, mine, or remove the
minerals beneath it. Since “the added value of the land is based simply on
the right to remove the gravel below the surface, the Mineral Code clearly
applies,” precluding such an action under Mineral Code article 17.78

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Hornsby, 854 So. 2d at 446.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 447.
LA. REV. STAT. § 31:5 (1975).
854 So. 2d at 447 (McClendon, J., dissenting).
Id. at 448.
Id.
Id.
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C. Thomas v. Pride Oil & Gas Properties (2009)
In 2009, the Western District of Louisiana weighed in on the issue
when an oil and gas lessor brought an action in state court seeking
rescission of a contract with the lessee; his initial claim was for fraud, and
in the alternative, on the grounds of lesion beyond moiety.79 In 2007, Mr.
Thomas and Pride Oil entered into a lease for oil, gas, and minerals.80 The
lease provided that Mr. Thomas would lease the property to Pride Oil for
a term of three years in exchange for $100.00, royalties of 3/16 of the
market value for oil and gas “produced and saved” from the land, and other
valuable consideration.81
Mr. Thomas filed an action in state court thereafter to rescind the sale,
alleging that “one of the largest natural gas deposits in the world” was
located beneath the leased property and that “at the time of the lease [he]
did not know of the existence of . . . deposits or of the[ir] extreme value.”82
Mr. Thomas stated that had he been aware of the valuable deposits below
his land, he would never have agreed to the lease at that price.83 Following
removal to federal court, the lessee filed a motion to dismiss.84 The district
court granted the motion and held that the allegations were insufficient in
several ways: to establish fraud, to state a claim that consideration paid
was out of proportion to value received, and for mistake as to cause of the
contract.85
The district court found that Mr. Thomas’s claim for rescission based
on lesion beyond moiety warranted a finding of no cause of action.86 Citing
Wilkins, the court discussed Louisiana’s long-standing rule that “a sale of
mineral rights ‘cannot be regarded as . . . falling within the terms of the law
which affords relief on the score of lesion; its inherent nature and character
being such as not to be susceptible of having an intrinsic definite and fixable
value,” thereafter applying the same logic in the facts of Thomas.87

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Thomas, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 240.
Id. at 239.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 240.
Id. at 239.
Id.
Id. at 243.
Id.
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D. Harruff v. King (2014)
In 2014, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the question of
“whether Louisiana law allows for the inclusion of the speculative value
of mineral interests or rights in and to immovable property in determining
the fair market value of such property for the purpose of rescinding the
sale of the property on the basis of lesion beyond moiety.”88
The plaintiffs, Harruff and Bildeau (hereafter referred to as “the
Sisters”), were siblings and heirs of decedent Bobby Carlisle. Mr. Cason,
also a plaintiff/appellee, was the subsequent purchaser of the property.89
The Sisters inherited an undivided interest in two tracts of land in
Natchitoches and Red River Parishes.90 About one year after the
inheritance, the Sisters sold their undivided interest in one of the two tracts
of land to Defendants Richard King, Renee King, and Kyle King (hereafter
referred to as “the Kings”).91 The sale included a cash sale deed
transferring ownership interests in the property the Kings for $175,000.00,
including the Sisters’ undivided interests in timber and minerals.92 Around
six months after the King deal, the Sisters sold the Natchitoches tract to
plaintiff Cason for $375,000.00, which was also a cash sale deed.93
Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed suit alleging the sale of property the Kings
should be rescinded due to lesion beyond moiety.94
After a trial on the merits, the trial court granted a rescission of the
sale based on lesion beyond moiety.95 The trial court cited Jones v. First
National Bank, Ruston, Louisiana, wherein the Louisiana Supreme Court
held that mineral interests or rights are to be included in the value of the
property, so long as both the land and mineral interests are sold together.96
The trial court focused heavily on the “unsevered” nature of the minerals,
and stated that:
The calculation of the value of the Property for purposes of lesion
beyond moiety should include the value of the unsevered mineral
rights as long as the transaction is not a transfer of mineral rights
alone . . . Unsevered mineral interests, or mineral rights, are owned
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Harruff v. King, 139 So. 3d 1062, 1064 (La. Ct. App. 2014).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1065.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1067.
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as part of the ownership of the land and constitute a part of the
corporeal immovable. If they increase the value of the land alone,
they should be considered.97
The appellate court agreed with the reasoning pertaining to the
“unsevered” nature of the mineral; however, instead of approaching the
analysis similar to those courts before it, the court seemingly overlooked
the issue of lesion applying to minerals and focused instead on the burden
required by a rescission on the basis of lesion, effectively finding that the
burden to prove the fair market value of the mineral interests in the property
had not been met.98
In this step, the court made a crucial mistake: allowing lesion to apply
to the sale of minerals and thereafter finding the obstacle that this allowance
creates. The court recognized that the minerals were unsevered, and
therefore, subject to no one’s ownership, but instead of drawing out this
crucial factor, the court moved forward to establish a value of those
minerals. This analysis overlooks the key determination of the speculative
nature of minerals not reduced to possession.
The court then turned to the testimony of the expert witness for the
plaintiff, who failed to prove the fair market value of the mineral interests
of the property at issue. The court appeared to stumble upon the problem at
this point. The land and mineral expert was unable to produce evidence of
the value of the minerals beneath the land. Therefore, since the landowner
had not yet reduced the minerals to possession, there was no proof of their
value; rather, there was merely “unsubstantiated assumptions and rank
speculation.”99
It is important to note not only what the court did discuss, but also what
the court failed to discuss, that being Louisiana Mineral Code article 17 and
the Civil Code’s distinction between movables and immovables, corporeal
and incorporeal. While recognizing the speculative nature of minerals
beneath the land, the court took yet another approach towards the specific
issue. This crucial error creates further bad precedent for the proper analysis
for an action for lesion beyond moiety and moves away from the original
intent of the Mineral Code’s preclusion for actions of lesion beyond moiety.
IV: WHAT SHOULD THE PROPER ANALYSIS LOOK LIKE?
The rulings in Wilkins, Hornsby, and Harruff come to differing
conclusions and interpretations and take different paths in reaching them.
97. Id.
98. Id. (citing Pierce v. Roussel, 79 So. 2d 567, 571 (La. 1955)).
99. Id. at 1070.
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It is likely that these particular issues will arise again in the future, even
more so with the recent discovery of the Haynesville Shale in Northwest
Louisiana. The addressing court will be faced with the challenge of
discerning between multiple indefinite and unsure approaches to a similar
problem, each of which provides a different solution. It appears that both
sides of the argument have valid precedent to support an argument both
for lesion beyond moiety, and also against an action for lesion beyond
moiety.
A. The Current Analytical Flaws in the Jurisprudence
Recalling Hornsby, the court held that solid minerals are integral parts
of the land; therefore, a tract of land is more valuable when the value of
those solid minerals beneath the surface are included.100 While this may
be equitably and objectively true, this argument is weak because it
completely ignores the civilian distinction between corporeal immovables
and incorporeal immovables. In addition to moving away from civilian
application, the court ignores the legislatively created law precluding
lesionary actions within the Mineral Code, effectively holding powerless
law created by the legislature. This ruling creates a system of prejudice
against purchasers, while favoring the seller in his pursuit of a win-win
situation. It effectively places all chance of loss upon the purchaser and
decreases the economic benefit of immovable sales and leases.
The Thomas court ruled on the facts of a mineral lease, reiterating the
Wilkins ruling that mineral rights are speculative in nature and that a sale of
minerals may not be rescinded on the grounds of lesion beyond moiety.101
The court’s ruling is similar to the proposed solution that this article offers;
however, clarification as to the difference between corporeals and
incorporeals, and how this distinction applies in the aspect of minerals,
mineral servitudes, and mineral leases, is necessary for clarity and punctuality.
The Harruff ruling further confused matters. It focused on the issue of
the burden of proof in a cause of action for lesion beyond moiety, and
simultaneously dodged the discussion of lesion’s application to minerals.102
While this ruling is the most recent voice of the Louisiana courts, it sets a
bad precedent for legal scholars, courts, and individuals bringing similar
claims to understand the civilian principles involved in this cause of action.
The analysis in this case is flawed, off point, and effectively convolutes the
actual issues.
100. See, e.g., Hornsby, 854 So. 2d at 445-46.
101. See, e.g., Thomas, 633 F. Supp. 2d 238.
102. See, e.g., Harruff, 139 So. 3d at 1067.

2017]

COMMENT

289

For the just application of the law, clarification and clear application
of these principles is required. A bright-line rule for the application of the
law of minerals, mineral rights, and mineral leases in accordance with the
cause of action for lesion is needed. A concise analytical framework must
be set forth to establish both reliable guidance for the benefit of the courts
and attorneys; such a framework should provide consistent results that
may be relied upon in the future.
Section D of this part provides a guideline for analyzing a cause of
action for lesion pertaining to minerals. This framework makes clear: (1)
the distinction between a corporeal immovable and an incorporeal
immovable, (2) how this distinction affects the outcome and analysis of
cases involving minerals and lesion, (3) the proper analysis for such an
action, and (4) why the Mineral Code’s preclusion of lesion should apply.
B. The Distinction: Corporeal and Incorporeal Immovables
Think back to Ms. Hornsby’s case.103 Ms. Hornsby’s previously
owned tract of land is clearly a corporeal immovable; therefore it is subject
to the Louisiana Civil Code article 2663’s claim for rescission on the
grounds of lesion beyond moiety.104 There is a clear distinction between a
corporeal immovable and those minerals beneath the immovable,105 with
the latter being precluded from an action based on lesion under the Mineral
Code’s article 17.
Louisiana is one of the many states classified as a “non-ownership”
state.106 This means that while the ownership of land includes all minerals
occurring naturally in their solid state, those minerals are insusceptible of
ownership apart from the land until reduced to possession.107 The Wilkins
Court established this rule of law, finding that the original Louisiana Civil
Code article 1862 for lesion “restricted the action of lesion to immovables
. . . which are such by their nature and not such as are made immovable by
disposition of law.”108 Such a disposition of law is clear from the Louisiana
Legislature’s “Act 205 of 1938, which defined and classified mineral
leases as real rights and as incorporeal immovable property.”109 The
103. Hornsby, 854 So. 2d 441.
104. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2589 (2017).
105. Wilkins, 99 So. at 608 (1924).
106. A. N. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW OF PROPERTY § 99 (1966); FrostJohnson Lumber Co. v. Salling’s Heirs, 91 So. 207 (1922).
107. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 31:5, 31:7 (1975) (emphasis added).
108. Wilkins, 99 So. at 608; see also Yiannopoulos, Movables, supra note 39,
at 518.
109. Yiannopoulos, Movables, supra note 39, at 551.
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purpose of this Act “would seem . . . to classify mineral leases as real rights
and incorporeal immovables for all purposes.”110
At the time of the sale, Ms. Hornsby had yet to reduce any minerals
from her land to possession. She was not even aware of the presence of
minerals beneath her land until after the sale of the property.111 While she
did own those solid minerals beneath her land according to Mineral Code
article 5, those solid minerals could not be conveyed through the sale of
the property because they had not yet been discovered and reduced to her
possession. In this situation, the land (corporeal immovable) should be
considered and valued distinct and separate from the value, if any, of the
minerals beneath the land.
In granting the rescission to Ms. Hornsby, the court implied
recognition of this distinction by valuing the sand and gravel separately
from the value of the land itself.112 The courts recognized this distinction
in each of the previously mentioned cases, with each court struggling to
apply a monetary value to subsurface minerals due to their “speculative”
and “unfixable” value.113 This determination is vital for maintaining the
unified civilian system of law in Louisiana and following the intent and
will of the legislative body. Recognizing that a tract of land and those
minerals found beneath it are distinctly classified, the focus turns to how
this distinction affects the analysis for a lesionary action.
C. Incorporeal Immovables Are Not Subject to Rescission Based on
Lesion
Upon sale of any tract of land, the seller conveys ownership of the
tract of land itself, including the attached real right to those minerals found
beneath the surface of the land, to the purchaser. However, the purchaser
does not convey “title of ownership to any specific thing, separate and
[distinct] from the soil, but merely the right to drill, capture, and reduce to
possession” any minerals that might be found beneath the surface.114 If
minerals were included in the valuation of the land, the courts would be faced
with valuing “an assumption of production which clearly illustrates . . . ‘the
speculative nature of mineral exploration.’”115 Such a determination is
110. Id. at 552.
111. 854 So. 2d at 445.
112. Id.
113. See, e.g., Wilkins, 99 So. 607; Hornsby, 854 So. 2d at 445; Thomas, 633
F. Supp. 2d at 244; Harruff, 139 So. 3d 1062.
114. Wilkins, 99 So. at 608.
115. Harruff, 139 So. 3d at 1070 (citing Cascio v. Twin Cities Dev., LLC, 48
So. 3d 341 (La. Ct. App. 2010)).
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extremely difficult and highly susceptible to manipulation by the
numerous factors that play into any evaluation, which has been shown
clearly in Harruff.116
Ms. Hornsby’s undeveloped property was sold within the range of the
appraised value.117 At the time of the sale, the value of this property was
approximately $28,000.00.118 Any minerals beneath the property were
purely speculative due to their undeveloped and undiscovered nature,
making a fixed value inherently indeterminable. Any value added to the
tract of land “resulting from the sand and gravel in the land arises from the
right to explore, mine, or remove these minerals.”119
Louisiana Civil Code article 2590 states that the immovable sold is
evaluated according to the state in which it was at the time of the sale.
Once discovered, “removed, and reduced to possession, the sand and
gravel can then be valued subject to the law of movables.”120 Such an
application follows this code article’s legislative intent that the evaluation
should occur at the time of the sale.
The Legislature’s enactment of the Mineral Code’s preclusion for
lesion was with these circumstances in mind.121 Allowing rescission of
such a sale would effectively reward zero risk on behalf of Ms. Hornsby,
and whisk away the valued investment of the purchaser. This placement
of risk on the investor/purchaser places an inequitable burden on the party,
placing the selling party in the ultimate position to take advantage of the
selling process. This inequity must not be permitted to continue, as the
legislature has noted and which is the intent behind the Mineral Code’s
preclusion for lesion.
D. The Proper Analysis for an Action for Lesion Beyond Moiety
Involving Minerals
The first issue the court should address when considering an action for
lesion is whether the sale involved a corporeal immovable, an incorporeal
immovable, or both. If the action discusses minerals, the sale included both
a corporeal immovable and an incorporeal immovable. In the case that the
sale included both a tract of land and considerations of the minerals
thereunder, the court must then factually determine whether the seller and
buyer were both cognizant of such minerals and their inclusion in the sale.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

139 So. 3d 1062.
Hornsby, 854 So. 2d at 442.
Id.
Id. at 448 (McClendon, J., dissenting).
Id.
LA. REV. STAT. § 31:17 (1975).
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In that situation, the action must be dismissed due to the recognition,
weighted value, and consideration of the minerals included within the sale.
If neither the seller nor purchaser were made aware of minerals
beneath the land at the time of the sale, the action would fall under the
Louisiana Civil Code’s allowance for an action for lesion beyond moiety,
assuming the immovable was sold at a value less than half of that which it
is valued for.122 However, since minerals (incorporeal immovables) are
involved, the action should be effectively precluded due to the preclusion of
lesionary actions under Mineral Code article 17. Thus far, courts have failed
to apply this simple methodology.
E. The Mineral Code’s Preclusion of Lesion Should Be Applied to All
Such Actions as Pertaining to Minerals
For over ninety years, “it has been the law of Louisiana that a sale of
mineral rights ‘cannot be regarded as . . . falling within the terms of the law
which affords relief on the score of lesion; its inherent nature and character
being such as not to be susceptible of having an intrinsic definite and fixable
value.’”123 The incorporeal nature of mineral rights is too speculative to affect
the valuation of the price of a tract of land.124 Upon purchase of land, both the
buyer and the seller understand the value of everything above the surface. The
seller is consciously committing to the sale of his land for a value that he
believes the land is worth to him at the time of the act. Prior to and thereafter,
“the price may be at the very lowest today . . . and reach the very peak of
prices tomorrow, dependent on the production or nonproduction of oil and gas
in the neighboring territory.” If courts allow the discovery of minerals
subsequent to the sale of an immovable to provide for rescission of such sale,
an inequitable shift would be applied to only the purchasing party.
Lesion is considered “an instrument of public policy that, with certain
limitations, allows the judicial policing of certain contracts that, because of
unfairness that can be objectively shown, are inconsistent with the welfare
of the community and therefore contrary to the public order.”125 Recall the
situation Ms. Hornsby was in previously and consider the practical
difference that the interpretation and application of the lesionary principles
this article has discussed could mean for landowners.
122. In the instance that the seller knew of the minerals beneath the land, and
the purchaser was not aware, the purchaser may have a cause of action based on
fraud, which was more thoroughly explored in the case of Thomas, 633 F. Supp.
2d at 241.
123. Id. at 243 (citing Wilkins v. Nelson, 99 So. 607, 608 (La. 1924)).
124. 99 So. at 609.
125. Hornsby, 854 So. 2d at 443.
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The law on sales of immovables, and sales in general, could be
substantially altered if lesion is applied to minerals. For instance, unknowing
landowners will have no incentive to survey and test their property before
selling the land. Individual purchasers are investing their money in tracts of
land, thereby burdening themselves with the risk against the prior owner’s
reward if minerals are later discovered that significantly raise the value of
the land. Increased litigation over these disputes would substantially
increase the court’s docket. Jury determinations of the value of certain
minerals and if those values are adequate for the lesion article to apply
would be considerably speculative and unpredictable.
By not applying lesion to minerals, Louisiana would have a bright-line
rule to follow, litigation would decline, and landowners will look to
develop their own land and have the land’s value assessed prior to the sale
or transfer of the land. Recognizing the fallacies of a possible draw-back
on the economic trade of property, the policy-implicated scale appears to
tilt in favor of not applying lesion to minerals.
CONCLUSION
Returning to the hypothetical at the beginning of this article, does a
cause of action exist against the purchaser of your land when minerals
have been discovered beneath the land post-sale? Under the current
jurisprudence of the state of Louisiana, perhaps. Under the correct
application of the legislation and civilian system of Louisiana, however,
no cause of action would exist.
Courts should apply a hybrid approach drawn from the Wilkins
majority opinion, the Hornsby dissenting opinion, and the Thomas court’s
discussion. This proposal provides a practical application that accurately
portrays how the Mineral Code’s prohibition on lesion pertaining to
mineral rights should be applied. If courts are to consider the right to
produce minerals separately for the purposes of lesion, then as such, and
as declared by the legislature, that right is to be considered an incorporeal
immovable separately from the corporeal nature of the tract of land when
considered on the basis of rescission post-sale, being effectively precluded
from such an action per the Mineral Code’s article 17.
While this approach may be inequitable on its face, the underlying
principle is supported by just reasoning and policy. Minerals beneath a
tract of land are inherently speculative with an unknown value until
removed from therein. If courts place a value on inherently speculative
minerals beneath the ground, an inequitable result will consistently occur.
To upset a contract established with consideration on behalf of the seller
who has used his or her personal judgment in valuing land, and a
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speculative purchaser of the land taking a risk in purchasing undeveloped
property, provides ill precedent for further interpretations.
The Mineral Code’s preclusion should remain in effect. This
preclusion should be rigidly applied to all rescission actions based on
lesion beyond moiety that involve the speculative nature of minerals.
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